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Abstract 
British foreign policy stands at a turning point following the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum. Drawing on 
role theory, we trace the UK’s efforts to establish new foreign policy roles as it interacts with 
concerned international actors. We find that the pro-Brexit desire to ‘take back control’ has not yet 
translated into a cogent foreign policy direction. In its efforts to avoid adopting the role of isolate, the 
UK has projected a disoriented foreign policy containing elements of partially incompatible roles such 
as great power, global trading state, leader of the Commonwealth, regional partner to the EU, and 
faithful ally to the US. The international community has, through processes of socialization and alter-
casting, largely rejected these efforts.	These role conflicts between the UK and international actors, as 
well as conflicts among its different role aspirations, has pressed UK policies towards its unwanted 
isolationist role, potentially shaping its long-term foreign policy orientation post-Brexit. 
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The 2016 British referendum decision to leave the European Union (EU) represents a major 
rupture in Britain’s international position.1 Brexit has sparked intense debate about Britain’s 
place in the world and will require “the largest rewiring of British foreign policy since World 
War II”.2 Leaving the EU will involve a fundamental shift in British foreign policy but how 
this re-orientation will play out is uncertain. While the ‘taking back control’ message of the 
‘Leave’ campaign foregrounded the enhanced sovereignty Britain would achieve, specific 
foreign policy directions any gains in sovereignty afforded were not clearly articulated. 
Moreover, most of Britain’s international partners were critical of Brexit before the 
referendum and have since developed their own views on what Brexit means and signifies3 
for Britain’s future place in international politics.4 Central to this question is Britain’s ability 
to simultaneously enhance its autonomy and find meaningful foreign policy roles for itself 
while avoiding becoming an isolated state.  
 
This article aims to navigate the international debates and uncertainty around Britain’s post-
Brexit foreign policy at this early but critical juncture. We use role theory to demonstrate how 
Britain is being socialised into foreign policy roles through interactions with other states in 
the international system.5 Specifically, we focus on Britain’s role location process6 since the 
referendum, identifying a set of foreign policy roles that Britain has either casted for or 
rejected and tracing how role expectations of other relevant international actors have affected 
these efforts. We argue that role conflicts between Britain’s conceptions of its own roles and 
international expectations towards Britain, along with the tensions and inconsistencies 
between the different roles Britain seeks to play, have not only increased uncertainty but may 
also be contributing to Britain’s unwanted drift toward greater isolationism. While there is 
continuing economic and political uncertainty about the outcome of Brexit, and the UK itself 
3	
	
struggles to clarify the scope and purpose of this major policy change, the early socialisation 
process reveals the core prospects of Britain’s role on the world stage and illuminates the 
long-term boundaries and opportunities for Britain’s post-Brexit foreign policy orientation.    
 
Our analysis builds on previous research using role theory to understand British foreign 
policy.7 The benefits of mapping the future of British foreign policy through role theory are 
twofold. First, this perspective emphasises the relational and interactive nature of roles states 
play in the international arena. Just as people cannot play the role of teachers unless others 
take up the role of students, states cannot adopt a role for themselves unless this role is 
accepted by other states. Britain’s foreign policy after Brexit will not be defined simply by 
what role Britain wants to play, but equally by what role other states let Britain play. Second, 
role theory provides a broad perspective on the foreign policy orientation of post-Brexit 
Britain, moving us beyond the details of on-going negotiations between Britain and the EU-
27 and toward more fundamental role interaction processes that are playing out, thus offering 
‘a means of interpreting current events in the light of their long-term implications’.8  
 
We propose that Brexit significantly transforms roles available to and expected for Britain 
and offer a role theoretical take on British foreign policy for the post-Brexit environment. 
This environment involves a collision between Britain’s preferred roles and those acceptable 
to international society. Empirically, our main purpose is to contribute to the academic 
discussion about British foreign policy after Brexit, which has only just begun.9 Theoretically, 
the article adds to the growing body of role theoretical work in International Relations,10 
specifically connecting to discussions of role socialisation11 and the importance of role 
conflict.12   
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Viewing Brexit through role theory reveals the central irony that the one role Britain has tried 
to prevent since the referendum – that of isolate – might emerge as precisely the role it is 
socialised into. Although Britain is casting for various alternative foreign policy roles (global 
trading state, great power, faithful ally to the US, regional partner to the EU and leader of the 
Commonwealth), these involve some mutual incompatibilities, and international responses to 
them have largely been sceptical. Such role rejections, in consequence, could push Britain 
towards the isolate role. The one other foreign policy role that looks most feasible – that of 
faithful ally to the US – is also tinged with the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ brand 
of isolationism. It is not our objective, however, to explore the relative weight the British 
government places on each of the roles it casts for. Rather, from our role theoretical 
perspective, which roles the government will come to prioritise will only emerge from the 
interactions between Britain and other international actors in the on-going role location 
process. 
 
Role Location and Role Conflict 
Role theory draws on a theatrical metaphor, seeing states in the international arena – like 
actors on a stage – playing roles that follow certain scripts.13 Roles are “repertoires of 
behaviour, inferred from others’ expectations and one’s own conceptions, selected at least 
partly in response to cues and demands”.14 Roles thus emerge from the interaction between 
role conceptions – an actor’s own preference for their roles – and role expectations ascribed 
to an actor by others. Roles prescribe certain behaviours which actors consider appropriate 
given their place in social structures.15 Holsti16 introduced role theory to the study of 
international relations, identifying several prototypical roles such as faithful ally, regional 
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leader, and isolate. Contemporary role theory research17 examines how states (egos) define 
and change roles18 and how other international actors (alters) try to influence and socialise 
states as they seek new roles.19 
 
The social and strategic interactions between ego and alter(s) through which ego finds a 
suitable international role is the role location process.20 For role theory, role location 
dynamics are socialisation, where states ‘learn’ their foreign policy roles in response to cues 
and demands of others.21 When a state casts for a new foreign policy role, it draws other 
international actors into this process. Alters may accept or reject ego’s preferred role and may 
alter-cast and socialise ego into alternative roles. If ego’s role conception and alters’ 
expectations are congruent, ego’s role is available and can be enacted. If they differ, role 
conflict ensues with each trying to promote or foreclose roles for ego.22  
 
Role conflicts are an important yet understudied aspect of role theory in foreign policy.23 
Although a variety of role conflicts are possible,24 we focus on two types.  First role conflicts 
can occur between ego and alter(s) regarding specific roles ego might play.25 In a successful 
role location process, repeated interactions between ego and alters lead to convergence of 
their views on the role ego should play, resolving role conflicts.  Second, inter-role conflicts 
arise when ego pursues two or more roles entailing contradictory behaviours,26 which may 
result in fragmented and incoherent foreign policy.27 Given its limited theoretical attention to 
date, our analysis explores the impact of these two types of role conflicts for Britain as they 
affect the early stages of role socialisation during Brexit.   
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While international roles are created through interactions between alters and ego, role theory 
invests both ego and alters with considerable scope for agency.28 Especially during the initial 
stages of role location, ego has significant autonomy in selecting roles it casts for, just as 
alters have discretion in how to respond to ego and to push different roles. This scope for 
agency narrows as interactions between ego and alter delimit the set of roles available for 
ego.29 When a state has been socialised into particular roles as a result of this process, these 
roles will ultimately impact how the state conducts its foreign policy.30 Early stages of role 
location and the resolution of role conflicts are thus crucial to the eventual foreign policy 
orientation of a state.  
 
We are interested in this early stage precisely because the roles available to Britain after it 
leaves the EU are still in flux, but are increasingly being circumscribed through its 
interactions with others. We trace how Britain, after the referendum, casted for a range of 
foreign policy roles, examining the international responses to each of these. We do not focus 
on domestic contestation over Britain’s future international roles. Rather, we take the 
government as the agent representing Britain on the international stage, explore the foreign 
policy roles it seeks to adopt for Britain, and examine international expectations in the post-
Brexit role location process.  
 
Empirically, the early stage of role location consists mainly of verbal government statements 
and claims, and only to a limited extent material foreign policy behaviours. Consequently, we 
identify the roles Britain has cast for primarily through analysis of major foreign policy 
speeches and other public interventions, for example op-ed articles, of leading foreign policy 
decision-makers in the British government since the June 2016 EU referendum. The article 
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thus adopts a method that is well-established in role theory research which explores role 
location principally through the lens of the speech acts of high-level decision makers.31 Such 
speech acts constitute meaningful and consequential behaviours that draw other international 
actors into the role location process and contribute to carving out Britain’s roles after Brexit. 
Over the longer term, however, the sustainability of any such roles will also depend on 
government discourse being supported by material capabilities and behaviours of both ego 
and alters.32  
 
The five roles we discuss have been pursued with some consistency by the British 
government and are in our judgment the most prominent roles in government discourse on 
British foreign policy since the referendum. While decision-makers generally do not make 
explicit references to these roles, we have discerned them from government statements that 
emphasise their core features and that can be interpreted as indicators of the roles. For each of 
the roles we then explore responses from a variety of international actors who are implicated 
by them. These actors include the governments of a range of Britain’s international partners 
as well as the EU and other international organisations. In this way, we use roles Britain has 
cast for to focus our analysis of international responses. It is important to note that the 
discourse the British government employs to cast for international roles may in part be 
strategic or merely rhetorical. For example, it might be used to strengthen Britain’s hand in 
the Brexit negotiations with the EU or for domestic political consumption. Irrespective of 
whether or not government decision-makers genuinely believe that Britain can and should 
play the roles they cast for, their discourse will nevertheless elicit international responses and 
feed into a process that delimits roles available to Britain after Brexit.  
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Locating Foreign Policy Roles for Post-Brexit Britain  
Britain’s efforts to locate a role since the referendum take place against the backdrop of 
international scepticism about Brexit.33 Nevertheless, Britain has claimed that leaving the EU 
has broadened, not narrowed, the set of substantive foreign policy roles it can play by virtue 
of the sovereignty it gained. In particular, Britain tried to counter international role forecasts 
that Brexit will leave Britain a diminished international actor and to avoid being socialised 
into the foreign policy role of an isolationist actor. British efforts to enact foreign policy roles, 
however, have largely elicited negative international responses. The foreign policy roles 
Britain has casted for can be identified as global trading state, great power, faithful ally to 
the US, regional partner to the EU and leader of the Commonwealth. These roles vary in the 
autonomy they offer, and who the key alters are that can effectively accept or reject each role. 
But what these roles have in common, first and foremost, is Britain’s rejection of the isolate 
role.34 
 
Isolate 
The post-referendum priority of the British government on the international stage was to 
avoid being socialised into the role of isolationist, which would see Britain draw back from 
the international stage, downscale the resources it expends externally and focus largely on 
domestic concerns.35 To avoid this role, Britain countered an emerging narrative that it might 
retrench from its international commitments and turn inwards.36 Indeed, the widespread view 
among international commentators was that the decision to leave the EU was a vote to go it 
alone, putting Britain on a “voyage to inglorious isolation”.37 From this perspective, the 
Brexit referendum was an “isolationist catastrophe”38 that brought to a head a pre-existing 
trend of Britain disengaging from the world. Interviews with members of the German 
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Bundestag in June 2017 reinforced this view that Brexit was an act of British self-demotion 
that would marginalise its international voice.39 Similarly, Britain’s international adversaries, 
most notably Russia, see Brexit as isolating Britain and seek to capitalise on Britain’s 
perceived weakness.40 What is more, there is evidence that the Russian government attempted 
to interfere in the referendum to support the case for leaving the EU.41 
 
Immediately after the referendum, leading ‘Leave’ campaigners and the British government 
advanced an internationalist counter-narrative to dispel notions that Britain was heading 
towards isolationism. Boris Johnson, the most popular face of the ‘Leave’ argument, used his 
column in the Eurosceptic Daily Telegraph days after the referendum to spin Brexit away 
from the ‘Leave’ side’s predominantly nationalist and inward-facing message:  
 
[M]illions of people who voted Leave were (…) inspired by the belief that Britain is a 
great country, and that outside the job-destroying coils of EU bureaucracy we can 
survive and thrive as never before. (…) There is every cause for optimism; a Britain 
rebooted, reset, renewed and able to engage with the whole world.42 
 
In his first official United Nations visit as Foreign Minister (FM), Johnson distanced Britain’s 
decision to leave the EU from the ‘America first’ message of then Republican Presidential 
nominee Donald Trump: 
 
I would draw a very, very strong contrast between Brexit and any kind of isolationism. 
(…) Brexit means us being more outward-looking, more engaged, more enthusiastic 
and committed on the world stage than ever before.43 
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Similarly, Secretary of State for International Trade Liam Fox44 told an audience in Bogota 
that international speculations that Brexit was “a symptom of insularity, and that the United 
Kingdom would be withdrawing from the world stage” were unfounded: “I am here to tell 
you that nothing, absolutely nothing, could be further from the truth”. In the words of PM 
Theresa May in a speech delivered in India, Britain was “determined not to turn our backs to 
the world”. 45  Britain thus tried to undercut impressions that Brexit equals “little 
Englanderism”46 and resisted being socialised into the role of an isolationist state.47 If not 
isolate, the question then was what sort of role Britain would actually seek to play. 
 
Global Trading State 
After the referendum, Britain has made a sustained effort to cast for the role of a global 
trading state. This role envisages Britain as an outward-looking, liberal and internationalist 
leader on global free trade. Along these lines, the British government has portrayed a ‘Global 
Britain’ that would emerge after ‘Brexit.’ This has become a primary frame through which it 
depicts Britain’s new foreign policy orientation.  
 
As a country that is “by instinct a great, global, trading nation”,48 Britain would remain “a 
great champion”49 and a “tireless advocate of global free trade”.50 It would “continue to make 
the case for liberalism and globalisation” and show “calm, determined, global leadership to 
shape a new era of globalisation”.51 Indeed, leaving the EU is an opportunity for Britain to 
become “more outward looking than ever”52 and to “step up to a new leadership role as the 
strongest and most forceful advocate for business, free markets and free trade anywhere in 
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the world”.53 This is, according to the British government, how the Brexit referendum should 
be understood: 
 
[T]he British people voted for change. (…) They voted to leave the European Union 
and embrace the world. (…) The result of the referendum was not a decision to turn 
inward and retreat from the world. (…) June the 23rd was not the moment Britain 
chose to step back from the world. It was the moment we chose to build a truly Global 
Britain.54 
 
It is precisely the sovereignty gained through the Brexit referendum that allows Britain to 
enact the role of a global trading state. For the British government, the referendum was “a 
vote to take control and make decisions for ourselves and, crucially, to become even more 
global and internationalist in action and in spirit”.55 After Brexit, Britain will have “for the 
first time in more than four decades (…) a fully independent trade policy”.56 This gives it the 
“opportunity to forge new trade deals around the world”57 and “to reassert our belief in a 
confident, sovereign and global Britain”:58 
 
We are going to be a confident country that is in control of its own destiny again. And 
it is because of that that we will be in a position to act in this global role.59 
 
The international reaction, however, to such attempts to cast itself as a global trading state is 
largely sceptical. Many of Britain’s international partners have emphasised the complexities 
in negotiating trade agreements and have made clear that they prioritise their trading 
relationship with the EU over Britain. These concerns were already articulated before the 
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referendum. For example, the Director-General of the WTO, Roberto Azevêdo, said Britain 
would not be allowed to “cut and paste” its existing terms of WTO membership if it left the 
EU, but would face “tortuous” re-negotiations of these terms:  
 
Pretty much all of the UK’s trade would somehow have to be negotiated. (…) It is 
extremely difficult and complex to negotiate these trade agreements. And slow as 
well.60 
 
This point was reiterated by the IMF, warning in its 2016 annual report that “negotiations on 
postexit arrangements would likely be protracted”. 61  Significantly, the challenges of 
negotiating post-Brexit trade deals were also raised by Britain’s closest bilateral partner, the 
US. In the most prominent international intervention in the British referendum debate, US 
President Barack Obama argued in a joint press conference with David Cameron: 
 
I think is fair to say that maybe some point down the line there might be a UK-US 
trade agreement, but it’s not going to happen any time soon because our focus is in 
negotiating with a big bloc of the European Union to get a trade agreement done. And 
UK is going to be in the back of the queue.62 
 
In a later intervention, Obama reiterated his view in a BBC interview: 
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My simple point is that it’s hard to negotiate trade deals. It takes a long time. And the 
point is that the UK would not be able to negotiate something with the United States 
faster than the EU. .63 
 
Canadian Prime Minister (PM) Justin Trudeau expressed a similar view, noting the trade deal 
between the EU and Canada took almost 10 years to negotiate and that “there’s nothing easy 
or automatic” in negotiating such deals.64 
 
Since the referendum, Britain’s attempts to secure trade commitments from its major non-EU 
trading partners have so far mainly been rebuffed. Britain is thwarted by its lack of 
sovereignty to negotiate trade deals until it has left the EU, and its international partners are 
reluctant to engage in substantive discussions about post-Brexit arrangements until the future 
British-EU relationship becomes clear. For example, FM Hunt had little more to show for his 
visit to Beijing than a vague promise from his Chinese counterpart “to open discussions about 
a possible free trade deal” after Brexit.65 Perhaps the most important example, however, is 
Japan’s response to what has been described as “quite aggressive”.66 British attempts to 
secure a commitment to a post-Brexit trade deal at May’s Tokyo visit in August 2017. 
Japanese officials made clear their priority was to finalise free trade negotiations with the EU 
and were unwilling to enter into discussions until they have more clarity about the final terms 
of Brexit. The only commitment the British government gained was that the two countries 
will carry over exactly the trade agreement negotiated between them to their bilateral post-
Brexit trading relationship.67 A similar arrangement was also floated for Britain’s future 
trading relationship with Canada.68 Britain’s seeking to copy and paste EU trade deals calls 
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into question the value of its enhanced sovereignty after Brexit to enact the role of a global 
trading state.  
 
The most positive response toward discussing post-Brexit trade deals has so far come from 
the US administration. President Trump has welcomed the prospect of a “major trade deal” 
with Britain, comparing it positively to what he perceives as EU protectionism. On his visit to 
Washington, FM Hunt detected “real enthusiasm from the US administration, from the 
President down, for a UK/US Free Trade Agreement” after Britain has left the EU.69 
However, the concerns of British consumer groups about food safety standards that 
resurfaced during Liam Fox’s visit to Washington in July 2017 indicate that any future 
negotiations about a US-Britain trade deal may be more protracted than the British 
government appears to envisage.70 Overall, across a range of international actors, with the 
exception of the US, Britain’s efforts to cast itself into a global trading state role have been 
challenged by assertions that it lacks the autonomy to pursue this role. 
 
Great Power 
Since the referendum, Britain has also cast for the role of great power. This role, like the 
global trading state role, is global in scope but differs significantly with its emphasis on 
superior military, economic and institutional resources and the special responsibilities and 
rights these resources confer. While it has often been said that Britain can no longer play the 
great power role,71 ambition for it has experienced a revival post-referendum. This fits with 
Britain’s attempt to reject the role of isolate, but is more ambitious than its efforts to enact the 
role of a global trading state. 
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In casting for a great power role, Britain portrays itself as a major military power with global 
reach and responsibilities. The government employs discourses that foreground its 
“outstanding capabilities” as the country with “the biggest defence budget in Europe”72 and 
“a leading member of NATO”.73 Correspondingly, Britain has reaffirmed its commitment to 
meet NATO targets on defence expenditure and has reinforced its contributions to European 
and international security ‘on the ground’. The British government agreed shortly after the 
Brexit referendum to deploy 650 troops to Estonia and Poland to strengthen NATO’s forward 
presence in Eastern Europe and has pledged to place another 3000 troops on call as part of a 
NATO rapid-response unit.74 Most symbolically, perhaps, Britain committed to restore its 
“military presence East of Suez”75 by rolling out a large-scale investment to re-open a naval 
support facility in Bahrain, “the first such facility East of Suez since 1971”.76 It has 
announced deployment of Royal Navy frigates to the Persian Gulf to achieve an “enduring 
presence” in the region and to demonstrate Britain’s “global reach and world class 
capability”.77 This is framed as a reversal of the policy of disengagement from East of Suez 
in the 1970s, which has come to embody Britain’s retreat from a great power role.78 That 
disengagement, for FM Johnson, was a historical mistake that the current government has 
corrected: “Britain is back East of Suez”.79 
 
In the same vein, the government’s discourse emphasises its ability to project military power 
on a global scale. Citing a joint air force exercise with Japan and South Korea, Johnson 
reminded an audience in New Delhi that “Britain remains one of a handful of countries able 
to deploy air power 7000 miles from our shores”.80 Similarly, Britain’s two “vast new aircraft 
carriers”81 are described as “a symbol of the United Kingdom as a great global, maritime 
nation” that “will transform the UK’s ability to project power around the world”.82  
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Complementing its claims to superior military power, the British government references its 
economic strength as “the fifth biggest economy on earth” and home to “the greatest financial 
capital in the world”.83 Another important plank of Britain’s claim to great power status is its 
position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As May reminded the UN 
General Assembly, that position places “special responsibilities” 84 on Britain which it takes 
seriously. As befits a great power, Britain carries no less than “a commitment to the whole 
world”.85  
 
The international view of a ‘great power Britain’, however, is quite the opposite, with no 
discernible support for Britain’s assertion that Brexit will strengthen its standing in the 
world.86 Rather, the expectation is that Brexit will diminish Britain on the international stage. 
Before the referendum, several international actors, especially from outside the EU, made 
clear their view Britain’s weight as an international partner is enhanced by EU membership 
and would suffer from leaving it. New Zealand PM John Key stated “We certainly think it is 
a stronger position for Britain to be in Europe”.87 Similarly, the German Finance Minister, 
Wolfgang Schäuble, suggested that Brexit would diminish Britain’s influence in international 
relations: “In the era of globalisation, ‘splendid isolation’ is not a smart option”.88 This view 
was shared by interviewees in the German Bundestag in June 2017 who doubted that Britain 
will even be able to play a middle-ranking power role after Brexit.89 The decision to leave the 
EU is seen as accelerating a longer-term decline in Britain’s influence that has it moving 
from the “first team” to the “reserve bench” in international politics.90 Brexit is also widely 
believed to reduce the influence Britain can wield through the UN system.91 A recent 
example is Britain’s failure to win support in the UN General Assembly for its candidate as 
judge in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), leaving Britain without an ICJ judge for the 
first time in the court’s history. Described as “a humiliating blow to British international 
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prestige”, it might be seen as a harbinger of Britain’s reduced status in the UN and on the 
international stage more generally.92 Post-Brexit Britain as a great power is in conflict with 
most international views, and Britain is being alter-casted as a diminished international actor 
for which the great power role is unavailable.  
 
Regional Partner to the EU 
Since the Brexit referendum Britain has also casted for the role of regional partner to the 
EU.93 This role counters the isolate role but is less global in scope than either great power or 
global trading state. It sees Britain and the EU developing a “deep and special partnership 
that takes in both economic and security cooperation”.94 To enable such a role, the British 
government communicates to its European audience that it wants to become the EU’s 
“strongest friend and partner”.95 It promotes what it describes as a “vision for a bold, 
ambitious and innovative new partnership with (…) our EU friends”.96: 
 
We are leaving the European Union but we are not leaving Europe. Our vote to leave 
the European Union was no rejection of the values we share with our European 
friends. The decision to leave the EU represents no desire to become more distant to 
our European neighbours. We will remain strong allies. I want our membership of the 
EU to be replaced by a strategic partnership, which should include an ambitious free 
trade agreement and many other kinds of cooperation.97 
 
Britain has made clear that it remains committed to European security and close collaboration 
in justice and home affairs. It seeks nothing less than a “new alliance” and a “bold new 
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strategic agreement” with the EU.98 From Britain’s view, the role of regional partner is not 
hindered by Brexit but rather facilitated by the sovereignty it will have gained.  
 
The availability of this role turns largely on the outcome of the Brexit talks between Britain 
and the EU. In these negotiations, however, the EU-27 has alter-casted Britain more as a 
supplicant than a regional partner, and the widespread view is that Britain conducts the 
negotiations as the fundamentally weaker side and that it will disproportionately bear the 
costs of Brexit. According to IMF estimates, Britain’s GDP will decline by almost 4% over 
the long term relative to the no-Brexit scenario if the negotiations fail to reach an agreement 
about the post-Brexit trading relationship between the EU and Britain, compared to a fall of 
only 1.5% for the EU-27.99 In the words of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, “our British friends will lose more than 
what we will lose”.100  
 
The priority of the EU-27 in the Brexit talks is less about partnering with Britain than with 
maintaining the unity of the remaining member states. To that end, leading EU members, in 
particular Germany and France, are willing to put aside specific economic interests and 
accommodate concerns of smaller member states.101 The guiding principle driving the 
common European line is that the outcome of Brexit negotiations must discourage other EU 
members from following the British example and help prevent further erosion of the EU. 
Thus any agreement about the post-Brexit relationship with Britain must be worse than the 
terms of full EU membership. As Maltese PM Joseph Muscat explained when Malta assumed 
the EU presidency, “we want a fair deal for the UK but that fair deal has to be inferior to 
membership”.102  
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The EU’s main focus is not its post-Brexit relationship to Britain, but rather further 
deepening European integration. For European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, 
the “wind is back in Europe’s sails” since the Brexit referendum. Junker proposes that the EU 
should “catch the wind”, in particular to further integrate around the Eurozone and the 
Schengen system: “We will advance, we must advance because Brexit is not everything. 
Because Brexit is not the future of Europe”.103 Given the views on Brexit in the EU and its 
focus on keeping European integration on track, the scope for Britain to enact the regional 
partner role is limited.  
 
Leader of the Commonwealth 
Since the Brexit referendum Britain has also casted for the leader of the Commonwealth role, 
which counters the isolate role but is less focused on Europe than the regional partner to the 
EU role. This role centres on upgrading Britain’s historical links to Commonwealth countries 
and turning the Commonwealth into a hub for Britain’s wider diplomatic and economic 
relations.104 This role is consistent with pre-referendum efforts to bring the Commonwealth 
“back at the very heart of British foreign policy”.105 Post-referendum, the government has 
intensified these efforts through official visits to a range of Commonwealth countries, 
including Australia, Canada, India, Kenya, New Zealand, Nigeria and South Africa. These 
largely symbolic gestures express the enhanced importance of these countries for Britain, as 
evident in May’s statement during her visit to India in November 2016: 
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I wanted to come to India on my first bilateral visit outside Europe because this 
relationship matters more than ever. (…) As the UK leaves the EU and India 
continues its rise in the world, we should seize the opportunities ahead.106 
 
Britain has casted for the Commonwealth leader role by emphasising bonds of shared values 
and the common heritage of Commonwealth members as well as opportunities for deeper 
trading relations. Visiting Australia, FM Johnson professed his belief in “the 
Commonwealth’s capacity to strengthen common values among its members”,107 such as 
democracy, the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Similarly, PM May in a joint 
statement with Indian PM Narendra Modi “recalled the strong bonds of friendship” between 
Britain and India: “Our shared history, our shared connections and our shared values make 
this a natural partnership. They form the foundations of a unique friendship.”108 
 
Britain prioritises trade with Commonwealth countries when it pushes for opening talks about 
post-Brexit relations. At the 2017 world economic forum, May highlighted that such talks 
had already begun “with countries like Australia, New Zealand and India”.109 On her visit to 
Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, May invoked the “deep historical ties” 110  of the 
Commonwealth to hold out the prospect of “a new partnership between the UK and our 
friends in Africa” that will see the UK become “the G7’s number one investor in Africa”.111 
In a speech in Sydney, FM Johnson suggested that after Brexit, “Australia will be at, or near, 
the front of the queue for a new Free Trade Agreement with Britain”.112 As for India, Johnson 
expressed Britain’s interest “to turbo charge [British-India relations]” with a new free trade 
deal.113  
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The reception of this role by the Commonwealth countries has been lukewarm, however. 
Many of these countries, including Australia, India, Canada and New Zealand, as well as a 
range of Commonwealth officials, were openly sceptical about Brexit before the 
referendum.114 Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull, for example, indicated having Britain as a 
close ally in the EU was “an unalloyed plus”: “We welcome Britain’s strong role in 
Europe”.115 Similarly, Commonwealth Secretary-General Patricia Scotland rejected as a 
“false choice” suggestions by Leave campaigners that Britain’s Commonwealth links should 
replace its EU membership: 
 
I say the Commonwealth offers a huge amount, but the Commonwealth does not set 
itself up in competition with Europe – we are partners.116 
 
Since the referendum, many have also objected to the neo-colonial overtones of Britain’s 
ambition to enact the role of Commonwealth leader,117 and even within Whitehall sceptical 
officials have branded the initiative “Empire 2.0”.118 Such neo-colonial critiques are perhaps 
even more compelling, given the dissonance between a Brexit desire for more sovereignty 
and Britain’s colonial past. 
 
Commonwealth countries also worry that Brexit will negatively impact their trade 
relationships with the EU.119 New Zealand, for example, will likely prioritise negotiating a 
free trade agreement with the EU over their future trading relations with Britain.120 India, in 
turn, considers Britain as an entry point into the European single market and might 
consequently attach less weight to Britain as a trading partner after Brexit.121 Indeed, 
commentaries of May’s visit to India have concluded that Britain has “little to offer in 
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exchange for desperately needed post-Brexit trade deals”.122 This suggests Britain’s trade 
negotiating position might be relatively weak: “Britain needs India more than India needs 
Britain”.123 There is little indication that Britain’s effort to enact the role of leader of the 
Commonwealth resonate with the Commonwealth countries, challenging its availability. 
 
Faithful Ally to the US 
Britain is also casting for a more limited foreign policy role of faithful ally to the US. This 
pitches Britain as the closest international partner of the US and is expected to secure US 
support for British interests and enhance British influence on the international stage. This 
“power by proxy”124 strategy underpins Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the US and has 
been a long-standing maxim in British foreign policy. Since the Brexit referendum, Britain 
intensified its affirmation of the continued ‘specialness’ of the relationship with the US. The 
British government discourse weaves together past achievements with the promise of a 
reinvigorated post-Brexit alliance, establishing a sense of continuity that transcends its 
decision to leave the EU. This was to counter concerns that Brexit might reduce the value the 
US attaches to its relations with Britain, which partly comes from Britain’s influence inside 
the EU.125 
 
May’s speech to the Republican Party Conference is the fullest example of British discourse 
on the faithful ally role. She reminded her audience of the “unique and special relationship 
that exists between [Britain and the US]”: 
 
[T]he leadership provided by our two countries through the special relationship has 
(…) made the modern world. (…) It is my honour and privilege to stand before you 
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today (…) to join hands as we pick up that mantel of leadership once more, to renew 
our special relationship and to recommit ourselves to the responsibility of leadership 
in the modern world. (…) So as we rediscover our confidence together – as you renew 
your nation just as we renew ours – we have the opportunity – indeed the 
responsibility – to renew the special relationship for this new age.126 
 
The US has generally reciprocated these role-seeking efforts. Immediately after the 
referendum, many in the US, including President Barack Obama, reassured Britain that the 
referendum outcome will not affect the ‘specialness’ of the US-British relationship. While 
Obama’s pro-‘Remain’ interventions in the referendum campaign raised concerns that Brexit 
would diminish US commitment to Britain, after the referendum Obama sought to dispel any 
doubts: “One thing that will not change is the special relationship that exists between our two 
nations”.127 Similar reactions came from other US leaders, including Chairman of the Senate 
foreign relations committee Bob Corker, Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, and 
State Department spokesperson John Kirby.128 When President Obama congratulated May on 
becoming PM in July 2016, he assured her that he would “protect and deepen”129 the special 
relationship.  
 
In contrast to President Obama, Donald Trump spoke out in favour of Brexit during the 
British referendum campaign130 and welcomed the result while a presidential candidate. 
Trump quickly promised to maintain the special relationship if elected President131 and, in a 
jibe at President Obama, made clear that under his Presidency Britain would “always be at 
the front of the line”. He claimed “zero will change” in US-British relations after Brexit.132 
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A strong symbolic reaffirmation of the ‘specialness’ of US-British relations after Trump took 
office came with PM May’s Washington visit in January 2017. Both governments highlighted 
that May was the first foreign Head of Government to pay an official visit to the newly-
elected US President in Washington.133 For May, the invitation to the White House was “an 
indication of the strength and importance of the special relationship”,134 and both President 
Trump and PM May used the visit to celebrate the special quality of the relationship. At their 
joint press conference on 27 January, Trump praised the “free and independent Britain” that 
emerged from the decision to leave the EU and gave his strongest endorsement of the special 
relationship: 
 
The special relationship between our two countries has been one of the great forces in 
history for justice and for peace (…). Today the United States renews our deep bonds 
with Britain (…). We pledge our lasting support to this most special relationship. (…) 
[O]ur relationship has never been stronger.135 
 
The US response to Brexit suggests that the role of faithful ally will continue to be available 
for Britain, making British efforts to cast for it feasible.  
 
Two important caveats are in order. First, the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ agenda 
and its economic nationalism create uncertainty for the longer-term sustainability of such a 
role.136 For example, the US 2017 decisions to impose a punitive tariff on a new model of 
Bombardier passenger jets built in Northern Ireland, despite the personal intervention of PM 
May,137 and to levy tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from the EU, strongly opposed by 
the British government,138 show how little concerns of its faithful ally count when US 
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economic interests are seen to be at stake. Trump’s public criticism of London Mayor Sadiq 
Khan’s handling of the June 2017 terrorist attacks in London, and his re-tweeting of a British 
right wing group’s anti-immigrant videos have prompted PM May to rebuke the US President, 
demonstrating difficulties Britain faces in keeping its faithful ally role under the Trump 
administration.139  
 
Second, this role has become increasingly contested in Britain domestically, especially after 
the 2003 Iraq War.140 Domestic unease with the role is only reinforced by the unpopularity of 
President Trump in British public opinion, with large majorities believing he has made the 
world a more dangerous place and having no confidence in him ‘doing the right thing’ in 
international affairs.141 The widespread protests in Britain against a planned Trump state 
visit142 and the public demonstrations against his scaled-down ‘working visit’ to Britain in 
July 2018143 show how controversial the US President is in British politics.  
 
Conclusion 
To paraphrase Dean Acheson’s famous quote: Britain has lost Europe and not yet found a 
role. Brexit has created a ‘role crisis’ for Britain, which may represent a fundamental turning 
point in its foreign policy orientation going forward. Two different types of role conflicts 
play into this: the degree to which these roles are mutually incompatible and the nature and 
variety of international actors each role must engage. The former has made for rather 
undirected foreign policy, and the latter risks pushing Britain toward the path of least 
resistance and the roles of faithful ally to the US or isolate. In unpacking this ‘role crisis’, we 
hope to facilitate a reflexive and critical discussion about possible future trajectories of 
British foreign policy after Brexit.  
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Tensions between the different roles Britain seeks is giving rise to a role conflict where ego’s 
role conceptions are incompatible with one another. Pursuing these roles at the same time can 
make for an incoherent foreign policy.144 For example, Britain’s efforts to play the role of 
global trading state are difficult to sync with the role of regional partner to the EU, not least 
because WTO rules imply inevitable trade-offs for Britain between embracing a customs 
union with the EU and having the freedom to pursue its own trade deals with non-EU 
countries.145 The role of great power sits uncomfortably with that of faithful ally to the US, as 
the former portrays signijficant foreign policy autonomy but the latter compels a good 
measure of compliance. The contest between a British and an Indian candidate for a seat on 
the benches of the ICJ illustrates the trade-offs between the great power and leader of the 
Commonwealth roles. These role conflicts confound Britain’s efforts to chart a clear foreign 
policy course, as efforts in one direction clash with efforts in another. Without a clear 
direction it will be difficult for Britain to enact any role.   
 
Moreover, international responses to its disjointed efforts to enact these different roles have 
largely been negative, creating additional role conflict between Britain’s role conception(s) 
and alters’ role expectations. Role theorists see this as potentially giving rise to poor relations 
between ego and alters.146 In the British case, this form of role conflict may be related to the 
number and type of international actors that must be engaged by each role, as a wider range 
of interested and powerful alters is likely to generate more resistance and alter-casting. While 
a single alter might accept or reject a new role sought by ego, multiple alters are involved 
makes socialisation more complicated. Alters may seek cues from others about how best to 
respond to ego’s efforts, and thus the nature of alters’ relationships to one another must also 
be considered.      
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This is clearly problematic for the role of great power, which is global in scope and requires 
acceptance by not only former EU partners Germany and France but also the US and other 
powers. Similarly, the leader of the Commonwealth role reaches broadly but lands 
awkwardly on those who would have to play the corollary ‘follower’ roles and who are 
instead seeking better trade deals. Britain would also have to overcome many obstacles to 
enact the role of global trading state, as individual countries might entertain trade deals with 
Britain but must also consider their relationship with the EU as a global economic actor. The 
regional partner to the EU role is challenged by EU-27 solidarity in its economic negotiations, 
and British efforts to highlight the value of security and counter-terrorism partnership can’t 
readily be separated from other regional partner dimensions. While the role of faithful ally to 
the US might be achievable for post-Brexit Britain, requiring the consent of only one major 
actor, its longer-term viability appears uncertain. Given the Trump administration’s ‘America 
First’ agenda this role is itself tinged with isolationism.  
 
The irony, therefore, is that Britain could end up being socialised into the one role it tries to 
avoid – the role of isolate. In order to prevent such an outcome, Britain might eventually put 
more weight on those roles that encounter the least resistance internationally, thereby 
reducing role conflicts. Overall, the role conflicts between Britain and different sets of alters, 
as well as among its own proposed roles, have systematically constrained British agency in 
the early stages of role socialisation. The Brexit case gives us novel insights about the 
importance of role conflicts, which have not received systematic attention in role theory 
research. Role theory, in turn, helps illuminate the sources and nature of the intense debates 
over the UK’s future as an international actor.    
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As yet, Britain’s role conflicts appear to remain largely unresolved.  Whilst Brexit 
negotiations between Britain and the EU-27 are undeniably intricate and consequential, 
locating a foreign policy role for Britain after Brexit is arguably even more difficult and 
fundamental. The remaining EU countries will survive the Brexit crisis and may set Europe 
sailing in new directions, leaving Britain somewhat ironically more fully free to be alone 
playing the role of a sovereign castaway on an island largely of its own making. While Brexit 
may have enhanced Britain’s sovereignty, it did not free its foreign policy, which remains 
conflicted between its anti-isolationist goals and the international community’s reluctance to 
accept the alternative roles it seeks to play. The outcome of the long game is still anyone’s 
guess, but the opening act of the Brexit play has set the stage for a difficult finale. 
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